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Stock Research and Analysis
(last updated October 2022)
Below are some of the stocks we have spent time researching, our brief opinions on their business, valuation, risks, and future. We don't make any buy or sell recommendations. Everyone's risk profiles and portfolio goals differ. We only provide some information and our opinion to help guide your research and/or decisions. As a warning, I tend to gravitate towards beaten down stocks, which generally have poor sentiment around them and present more risk (we all have our flaws, this is one of mine). If you have questions or comments about any of the companies below or another company, feel free to ask us here. If you are unfamiliar with a term, try the Glossary. Additionally, I advise reading the newsletters in chronological order before inquiring into specific stocks.
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The risk/reward scores below are given on a scale of 1-7. For risk, a score of 1 means very low risk (risk includes many factors, including its valuation). For reward, a score of 7 means very high upside potential.
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Alphabet ($GOOG) (as of Sept. 8, 2022, with stock at $109.42)
Basic/Key Financial Data:
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Trading at 20x TTM earnings (Price to Earnings Ratio)
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Historically growing at roughly 20-25% YoY (some minor ups and downs since advertising is cyclical)
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Net margin of 25%
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Immaculate balance sheet and free cash flow
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$70b+ authorized buyback
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Not much else to say - GOOG is a cash printing machine
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [2] GOOG is a relatively low risk quality name with a strong balance sheet and cash flow. The main risk to GOOG is cyclicality, meaning when macroeconomic conditions worsen, companies will spend less on advertising, thus hurting GOOG's revenues. However, GOOG does not nearly get hit as hard as some other advertising platforms; this is because Google search is an essential marketing tool for companies and it is probably the last expense they will cut from their advertising budget. GOOG's current valuation is at historical lows, and thus there is probably not much further downside on the multiple side unless macroeconomic conditions significantly worsen. Earnings in the short-term might be hurt by businesses cutting advertising spend in fear of a slowing economy/recession.
Upside Potential (1-7): [3] GOOG is a mature company and one of the largest in the world. It is still showing impressive growth given its size, but the stock obviously won't be a quick double up. Instead, investors view GOOG as a core holding that can probably give double-digit CAGR (compounded annual growth rate) over the long-haul. GOOG is particularly compelling right now given its 20x PE ratio. Historically, GOOG has traded in the high 20s. If macroeconomic conditions and interest rates improve, GOOG will almost certainly see a bit of multiple expansion. GOOG's long-term upside potential is also supported by its stock buybacks which rewards long term investors. Overall, there are modest gains to be made in GOOG, but it is a conservative position fit for a core holding in a portfolio rather than a speculative play.
Why I Like the Stock:
Google's search engine business has become one of those rare "verbs" that define an industry. Googling something is an everyday term and they pretty much hold a monopoly on the search engine market. Businesses prioritize advertising on Google and will probably prioritize maintaining their advertisements on Google over other smaller platforms in an economic downturn. GOOG's enormous network of users on Android devices, Google search engine, YouTube, GMail and other platforms allows it to collect a large amount of data on its users, improving its algorithms and ability to monetize on targeted ads.
YouTube has become a fast-growing business competing with streaming services like Netflix and Disney+ for screen time, and also with Instagram and TikTok with YouTube shorts. One of YouTube's main advantages is that it does not have to pay to create and market content like other streaming platforms. Rather, it is a platform for its content creators who do all the work in making and promoting videos. YouTube receives a portion of the profits generated by its advertisements and YouTube Premium subscriptions, making it a much less capital intensive model than other video platforms like Netflix. In my personal experience, its recommendation algorithm is very good and keeps users hooked on the app, allowing it to capitalize on its targeted advertising model.
GOOG has the ability and history of buying back a meaningful portion of its stock over the last few years. Its current buyback authorization, cash balance, and free cash flow allows it to buy back shares at the current depressed valuation. Generally, when companies buy back stock in times when the stock is declining and at historically low valuations (such as now), longer-term investors are rewarded (this assumes the fundamentals of the business are still strong and not deteriorating, which does not seem to be the case for GOOG). Its current buyback plan, at GOOG's current valuation of ~$1.4 trillion, authorizes the company to repurchase up to approximately 5% of its outstanding shares, which is a meaningful amount and is likely to continue throughout the decade.
Apple's privacy changes (which now give users the choice of whether to allow apps to track their data) have harmed Facebook and Snapchat since they are more reliant on collecting user data across different applications to target advertisements. While business will now probably scale back Facebook and Snapchat advertising spend because of their diminished targeting ability, GOOG does not suffer the same consequences since Google's advertisements are primarily based on people's searches on its own website and apps. Therefore, GOOG's ability to target ads to people's interests is not harmed nearly as much as Facebook and Snapchat's due to Apple's privacy changes, leading to more resilient advertising revenue, and perhaps even migration from advertising on other platforms to GOOG. While Facebook and Snapchat need to maneuver their way around Apple's privacy changes, GOOG is able to provide a more reliable and efficient source of advertising spend for businesses.
In conclusion, Google is a well-loved investment on Wall Street that is considered very high quality. While macroeconomic concerns and risks of a slowdown in online advertising have clobbered all technology stocks, dragging GOOG to an all-time low PE multiple, once macroeconomic concerns improve and the stock market begins to recover, GOOG will probably be one of the market leaders. As for now, short-term headwinds remain and investors should be willing to stomach volatility as ad spend slows, rates rise, and the company faces foreign exchange headwinds due to the strengthening dollar.
Teladoc ($TDOC) (as of Sept. 8, 2022, with stock at $32.40)
Background:
Teladoc provides an online/mobile platform for connecting with doctors at any time and receiving prescriptions on the spot. It offers mental health support and chronic care services as well. Its chronic care services (from Livongo acquisition) includes smart devices used to track conditions such as diabetes on the app. Basically, Teladoc hopes to provide all the medical services that are possible without physical examination through their secure online services, with all the patient's information and medical data available and safely stored. After all, who wants to make doctor visits, schedule appointments ahead of time, and sit in a waiting room when you can do it online (assuming it is not an emergency).
Basic/Key Financial Data:
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$2.3b in TTM (trailing 12 mo) revenue
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Trading at ~2x TTM revenue (aka Price-to-Sales multiple)
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Gross Margins of ~68% (holding steady over last few quarters)
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Positive Operating Cash Flow ($60m last quarter)
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Growing at roughly 20% YoY (this is comparing to very strong growth in the prior year- historically, growth has been higher but it has slowed in recent quarters due to pull-forward COVID demand)
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ARPU (average revenue per user) increasing 10% YoY
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Subscription Revenue makes up almost 90% of Total Revenue (recurring revenue from subscriptions is viewed much for favorably by investors than one-time purchases)
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [4] Ordinarily, this is a higher risk and more speculative stock, but given its already large decline and cheap valuation, I think a lot of the risk is already priced in. The main risk I notice that the market is worried about is too much competition in the industry and no competitive edge, leading to lower margins and price wars. Another worry is that tele-health is a COVID-era fad. This is a very hated stock right now and sentiment is really poor. Additionally, investors and analysts REALLY seem to hate Teladoc's recent large acquisition of Livongo, claiming it overpaid for it. However, while the price tag might have seemed steep, most of the consideration paid was Teladoc's own stock when it was very high (in the 200s) which offsets the big premium it paid for Livongo. The market currently hates unprofitable tech companies, especially "work-from-home" ones, so short-term volatility and bad sentiment are definitely concerns for investors considering a long-term position in TDOC.
Upside Potential (1-7): [6] If tele-health becomes the large industry it is projected to be and disrupts the healthcare sector, Teladoc is poised to be a big beneficiary as it is by far the market leader in terms of revenue and users. Additionally, the valuation (2x sales) is very cheap, so multiple expansion can amplify long-term returns. Teladoc is growing every quarter and has high gross margins, providing a potential pathway to strong profitability later on and opportunities to cross-sell products to existing users cheaply and quickly. Also, when sentiment around a stock is this bad, one of two things can occur: 1) the consensus is correct and the stock will continue to perform poorly or stay flat, or 2) the consensus is wrong and there is a very favorable risk-reward opportunity with outsized potential gains.
Why I Like the Stock:​
If I had to summarize, the risk-reward is just too enticing to ignore. This is one of those stocks where your upside can be multiples of your original investment in a relatively short period of time (while you are only risking 100% of your capital, your potential upside is probably 500% or more in the next few years if the thesis stays intact and growth remains 20-30%+).
First, the price-to-sales multiple has fallen more than ten-fold over the last year to a measly 2x, a multiple that is generally appropriate for low-growth cyclical companies. Most recurring revenue software companies with similar gross margins, growth rates, and % of recurring revenue are trading at 5x revenue or more. Even smaller tele-health companies are trading at higher multiples ($SGFY got acquired recently by CVS for roughly 10x revenue). While Teladoc is in a more unproven industry than traditional software companies, the growth potential and TAM (total addressable market) offer strong long-term prospects.
Second, the multiple contraction and huge decline in the stock price seem to be mainly attributable to rising interest rates and the market's general dislike towards high-growth companies and COVID-era darlings. I think when the sentiment shifts in the macroeconomic environment, investors will start to show interest in TDOC again.
Third, the financials are surprisingly strong relative to peers and other software companies. Gross margins are at a strong 68% and improving a bit over the last few quarters, operating cash flows are consistently positive, revenue is still growing materially (even though at a slower rate than before), the balance sheet is sound with plenty of cash, # of shares outstanding are remaining steady which means no dilution (most of the stock-based compensation and dilution from Livongo acquisition is done), and average revenue per user is increasing steadily. Teladoc does not seem to have to cut prices to attract members and has an opportunity to cross-sell many products in the future to their existing users, adding to the company's future profitability potential.
Fourth, when looking at TDOC's historical valuation multiple, it is by far the cheapest it has ever traded, even when considering an increase in shares outstanding due to stock-based compensation. In 2017, it made $4.20 in revenue per share, 2018 - $6.33, 2019 - $7.68, 2020 - $12.02, 2021 - $12.94, and 2022 (based on full-year revenue guidance) - $14.90. This growth in revenue/share means that despite using stock-based compensation, the revenue growth has far exceeded the dilutive effects. Now for comparison, Teladoc traded at roughly $30 throughout 2017, which is at the same price it trades at now, BUT the company is earning 3.5 times more revenue per share than it did in 2017. While merely buying a stock on historically cheap valuation can be a bad idea, if the operations, thesis, and financials of the company are still intact (they are for TDOC in my view), then a disproportionate risk-reward opportunity could exist.
Fifth, there is a safety net if the stock keeps falling or doesn't recover - an acquisition. We have already seen CVS and AMZN recently acquire their way into the tele-health space. With Teladoc being the market leader by far (more than 50 million Americans are Teladoc members) and the stock trading so cheaply, it would not surprise me to see UNH or another big healthcare company acquire them. At first, I thought Amazon would acquire Teladoc since they were planning on expanding their tele-health platform, but they ended up acquiring a Teladoc competitor, $ONEM ($ONEM was acquired by Amazon at almost 5x revenue, a steep premium to what Teladoc trades at now). These recent acquisitions also validate the future of the tele-health space and that it's probably not a COVID fad.
Sixth, Teladoc is more of a secular growth story, meaning it is more resilient to macroeconomic downturns than cyclical companies. Unlike industries such as banks, oil, consumer discretionary, etc., the healthcare industry does not fluctuate much based on economic conditions. People and business are not likely to cut healthcare costs in an economic downturn. Teladoc is not only in the defensive sector of healthcare, it is also a growth story as it is seeking to transform the sector. Therefore, Teladoc should be more attractive to investors who are seeking less-cyclical companies.
Seventh, in November 2021, Teladoc guided for $4b in revenue in 2024, which implies an annual growth rate of 30%. Considering the tough macroeconomic environment and companies missing guidance by landslides, Teladoc's guidance has been pretty spot on, if not conservative, over the last few quarters. There is no reason to doubt that they can reach that milestone in 2024. If so, I cannot imagine Teladoc trading anywhere near the market cap it is trading at now ($5b), as a nearly 1x revenue multiple would be ridiculous.
Eighth, as mentioned above, Teladoc is a recurring revenue software company that happens to be in the healthcare space. Right now, it is investing and spending a considerable amount to grow its member-base. Once Teladoc focuses on profitability rather than growth, I imagine it can achieve at least 15%+ net margins. Hypothetically speaking, if this were to happen now, it would mean Teladoc has roughly $350m in recurring profits, and therefore would be trading at below 15 PE. That is a ridiculously cheap multiple. If Teladoc continues growing at or anywhere near the pace it has done so over the last few years, once it focuses on profitability its margins will be compelling enough to warrant a significant multiple expansion in addition to its growing earnings.
Lastly, this final note is a long-shot and part of my imaginary thinking, but I think that far in the future, Teladoc can use AI and data analytics to analyze its users' medical data and history. Perhaps this could lead to detecting problems in patients early on to allow for better treatment, predicting the probability of future health problems in patients, or helping solve medical mysteries such as the causes of certain illnesses.
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Meta Platforms ($META) (as of October 26, 2022, with stock at $97.94)
In Q2 2022, Meta had 2.9 billion daily active users, a number which has slowly but steadily increased every quarter for years. That means over 35% of the entire globe uses one of Meta's products everyday (for simplicity, we assume all users are individuals and not businesses), creating an active social network that is unmatched. Even though competition from several different social media companies such as Snapchat, MySpace, and Twitter has taken up user time over the years, Meta's platforms have continued to accumulate users and have grown their monetization per user significantly over the past decade. This continuous growth, fueled by a growing population, increased reliance on digital platforms, and the insatiable desire to connect with others online, will not stop in my opinion, but has merely slowed down after pull-forward from COVID. I don't think users see TikTok or any other social media platform as a replacement for Facebook and Instagram, but rather just a distraction. Facebook and Instagram have maintained loyalty among users, even though some might use them less often over time. At least for the foreseeable future, these core platforms will remain a source of communicating and entertainment for users, and a source of important revenue generation for businesses.
While TikTok has grown as a competitor to all social media companies, TikTok's origins in China (owned by Chinese company ByteDance) have created unique circumstances which tilt favorably towards Meta and other American-based social media companies. Recently, American government officials have shown increased interest in restricting or banning the use of TIkTok in America to prevent the Chinese government from obtaining data about Americans. The Chinese government has shown it is not afraid to regulate any industry within its borders and extends its power into the affairs of private companies. With increasing tension between the US and Chinese governments, politicians on both sides of the aisle are cautious of the Chinese government. There have been proposals to ban TIkTok in America altogether or at least place strict restrictions on data-sharing if that's even possible to do reliably. If US regulators/politicians follow through, that will obviously be a positive for Meta as it eliminates one of Meta's main risks.
The "metaverse" is an elusive concept that no one really knows how it will pan out over the decades. However, many companies and influential innovators have branded the metaverse as one of the next big things in technology, even though it can be argued that it already exists to a certain extent. Anyway, Meta and Mark Zuckerberg have clearly placed a huge emphasis on the metaverse and see an enormous opportunity/market for it in the future. That is why Zuckerberg has decided to triple down early on and go all in on investing in the metaverse so it can become a market leader. Along with the concept of the metaverse comes virtual reality, augmented reality, online worlds, and more. Zuckerberg is a visionary who remains at the head of his company, something that is pretty rare to find nowadays in large companies. He has proven his ability to see ahead and innovate accordingly, whether it was the original Facebook, shifting to mobile, or buying Instagram. When someone invests in Meta, they also invest in Zuckerberg. Although the large investments in the metaverse won't see any payoff in the short-term, if the metaverse ends up being anything close to what Zuckerberg and others say it will be, then Meta will be ready to reap the large rewards. It is also important to keep in mind that Meta can afford to blow money given their high FCF margins and strong balance sheet, and they have said that they will cut back on the $10b/year spend if it is prudent to do so. However, investors in 2022 want nothing to do with companies blowing money on unprofitable projects. Metaverse spend has significantly decreased Meta's earnings over the past few quarters with no signal that they will slow down. Thus, the stock will likely be out of favor until there is more clarity and certainty. If you strip out Metaverse spend, Meta's core business is still very profitable and doing decently well given the macroeconomic backdrop.
Additionally, one legitimate fear with the future growth of the company is that younger kids no longer user Facebook. One way to appeal to investors with that fear is that kids nowadays are obsessed with video games and virtual worlds, and thus the Metaverse is a good way to hedge a change in future generations' behaviors. While this potential growth avenue is years, if not decades, down the line, it offers investors a somewhat speculative opportunity to bet on Zuckerberg's innovative capabilities. I don't have a crystal ball or a strong opinion on the viability of a Metaverse-based business, but based on the opinions' of many top tech executives, there is merit in the vision.
More immediate monetization opportunities for Meta include Instagram Reels, WhatsApp, and the hardware segment of Reality Labs which makes VR headsets. While I have not done much research, I have read that Meta has not monetized WhatsApp to anywhere near its potential and it is on Zuckerberg's to do list. They plan to do this through business-to-consumer messaging and advertising. As for Instagram Reels, Meta is still trying to optimize the algorithm and explore the best ways to monetize through advertisements. Reality Labs is already selling VR headsets, which will likely only grow as a sector in the future as the technology improves and the glasses shrink in size. These other channels of revenue can be meaningful complements to Meta's core businesses of Facebook and Instagram advertising while investors wait a longer time for metaverse monetization.
Although I have already emphasized Meta's strong financials such as their margins, free cash flow, historical growth, and buyback potential, it is once again worth emphasizing that Meta is trading way way below its historic multiple and is being priced as a company with a lot of trouble ahead. Meta trading at 10x trailing earnings shocks me and makes me think that I'm missing something. If the past is any indication of the future, Meta will be fine and will continue to provide impressive shareholder returns over the long term through user growth, earnings growth, buybacks, and probably multiple expansion. Just a year ago investors were flocking over Meta stock, paying almost 30 PE for it, but got scared away for reasons mentioned above. Just for further comparison, Meta has traded at roughly 9x revenue over the last few years and in the double digit revenue multiples before that - it now trades at almost a measly 3x revenue. Its valuation has been crushed compare to peers and to its own history. I think the risk reward is enticing for someone looking to add a core position in their portfolio that can easily offer double-digit annual returns over the next decade if Armageddon doesn't strike the company. After all, the lower the stock goes, the more shares Meta can buy back at the cheaper price, rewarding long-term investors even more. Sure, ad spend will slow in the coming months but that's just part of the economic cycle. As discussed in the newsletters, trying to time markets and get in and out of a stock is not a reliable method of long-term investing.
In conclusion, I like Meta for the relatively moderate risk given its already massive decline but strong financials. If things get back on track in the macroeconomic world, I think Meta will be just fine and offer modest returns over the long-haul. If the metaverse turns out to be what Zuckerberg claims, Meta will once again make a run for a trillion (reached briefly in 2021) or multi-trillion dollar company and offer rich rewards for patient investors. As for near-term headwinds, businesses will likely cut ad spend due to macroeconomic fears (hurting Meta's revenue), profitability won't show up in headline numbers due to Metaverse spend, cost-cutting initiatives will take time to drop to the bottom line, and monetization on Reels/WhatsApp will take some time to materialize. Like GOOG, an investment in Meta is one based on years of upcoming buybacks, FCF generation, and more optimism about the macroeconomic environment.
Basic/Key Financial Data:
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Trading at 10x TTM earnings (Price to Earnings Ratio)
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Historically grown revenue at 35%+ (last decade)
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ARPU (average revenue/user) has grown ~25% (last decade)
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Net margins of ~30% (this is very good)
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FCF multiple in the low teens
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30%+ FCF margin (without the excessive metaverse spend)
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~$17b remaining in buyback authorization
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [3] Meta is a medium risk quality name with a strong balance sheet and cash flow. It now trades at a historically-low multiple, meaning a lot of its risks are probably already priced in. Therefore, from a multiple standpoint, we are probably very near a bottom. It is trading at FCF and earnings multiples comparable to low-growth consumer staple and cyclical companies. In my opinion, it is no longer priced anything like a growth/tech stock, and so any further selling pressure will probably be due to a deep recession or a significant deterioration in META's core businesses. One of the primary risks investors are concerned about is competition from TikTok (short-form video). TikTok is competing with Instagram for user's time, and therefore precious advertising revenue. While Meta has launched Reels in response to TikTok and is very focused on fine-tuning it, and eventually monetizing, TikTok remains a competitor for user time and attention. Next, Meta has obviously emphasized its focus on investing in the metaverse and how it sees it as an enormous opportunity for innovation. They are burning, and plan to burn through, roughly $10b/year on metaverse-related R&D. The market does not like this for two main reasons: 1) the metaverse is an unproven idea and many remain skeptical as to how pervasive the concept will be or what it even means, and 2) macroeconomic conditions are quickly deteriorating, making smart capital allocation more crucial. Additionally, as mentioned in the Google section, Apple recently updated its privacy settings limiting the data collection for advertisers and its tracking capability, making Facebook and other digital advertisers' targeting capability less effective. This essentially means less ad revenue for companies relying on user data from multiple apps. If Meta does not adapt and find other ways to improve its advertising efficiency (I think they can figure it out with multiple methods), then it has a somewhat significant revenue headwind, at least in the short-term (Meta said this will impact $10b of revenue in 2022, roughly 8% of total revenues). Finally, while not specific to Meta, macroeconomic slowdowns lead to companies spending less on advertising. With the worries of a recession due to Fed tightening, Meta's advertising revenues can be impacted depending on the severity of the recession.
Click here if you want to read an article I found that goes into much more detail on Meta's three main risks.
Upside Potential (1-7): [4] META, like GOOG, is a mature company and one of the largest in the world. It has shown impressive growth over the past decade and is highly profitable. Compared to other megacap names who have shown similar resilience, dominance, growth, and profitability over the last decade (such as GOOG, APPL, MSFT), META's upside is much more enticing. If, or when, META figures out how to adapt from Apple's privacy restrictions, optimize and monetize Reels, and macroeconomic conditions improve, its earnings will eventually begin to steadily grow over the years, although not at the same pace as the past decade (discussed further below). Along with improved earnings, there is ample room for multiple expansion from a PE in the low teens back into the 20s. This multiple expansion is likely to be triggered by either of the above risks being dispelled or proven less consequential than previously assumed, or interest rates/macroeconomic conditions improving. In addition to eventual earnings stabilization and growth, shareholder returns will be amplified by META's large buyback plan. META's shares outstanding have been declining slowly over the last few quarters due to buybacks and will likely accelerate given the $17b in remaining buyback authorization and META's cash-rich business. Additionally, for the first time ever, META issued bonds to raise $10b. They really are in no need of the cash due to their FCF, so it is likely that the money raised will be used to repurchase shares. Buybacks, combined with multiple expansion and stable (and hopefully growing) earnings in the next several years, provides a runway for considerable share price appreciation, perhaps even doubling in a couple of years. While metaverse spend remains substantial, if macroeconomic conditions worsen and they are forced to cut spend, META will have a hefty cash balance and FCF to provide shareholder value. Investors are currently very skeptical of META's future - if some of these risks that are likely already priced in subside, the upside for Meta is unusually large for a megacap tech company.
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Why I Like the Stock:
I'm sure everyone is aware of Facebook and Instagram, the core of Meta's business. Their revenue is almost entirely from advertisements. Large corporations, small businesses, and entrepreneurs all rely on Facebook/Instagram's easy method of beginning an advertising campaign and targeting specific customers. Like Google, Facebook/Instagram are at the top of the list for businesses in terms of advertising spend. In an economic slowdown, businesses are less likely to cut spend from Facebook/Instagram than other advertising platforms. This is because of the massive user-base on Facebook/Instagram that allow you to target ads to a specific, but large group of customers. Advertisers get their bang for their buck with relatively low cost, easy to use/track, and precise targeting.
Upstart ($UPST) (as of Sept. 8, 2022, with stock at $25.90)
Basic/Key Financial Data:
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$1.05 billion in TTM (trailing 12 mo) revenue
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Trading at ~2x TTM revenue (aka Price-to-Sales multiple)
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Gross Margins of ~85%
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Contribution Margin (revenue minus all variable costs) of ~50%
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800m in unrestricted cash
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Positive operating and free cash flow (generally, but varies if forced to use balance sheet to fund loans like last 2 quarters)
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400m authorized buyback (125m already used in Q2 2022 to purchase 3.5m, or ~4%, of its stock back)
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Annual revenue between 2018 and 2021 grew at a CAGR of 90%! (this does not include the first half of 2022 which is when their revenues starting declining - more on this later)
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Profitable (ignoring the last 2 outlier quarters in 2022, UPST earned $1.43/share in 2021, implying an 18 PE currently)
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [6] UPST is a highly volatile stock that is highly shorted and traded very frequently. It moves a lot and not necessarily always on fundamentals or because of the broad market. It is popular for technical traders and also among the retail community. Therefore, the stock moves viciously and can be hard for newer investors to stomach. As far as fundamental risks, UPST's model has not been tested during a recession and periods of rising interest rates. Although their risk assessment model still seems to be "better" than its competition of traditional credit scores based on recent data, it still needs a more proven and longer track record to gain investor confidence. UPST's biggest pain point in recent quarters has been its inability to fund loans because lenders are reluctant to fund loans in such tight economic conditions; even though UPST has the demand from consumers for certain loans, the lenders it is partnered with are being very conservative. This has forced UPST to deny borrowers solely because of a lack of funding and to also fund loans from its own balance sheet. The investing community does NOT like that UPST is using its balance sheet to fund loans as it exposes them to credit risk, as opposed to their usual business model of just being the middle-man and collecting fees. As far as valuation-wise, a lot of de-risking has already occurred and a lot of bad news is priced in. Therefore, unless things turn much worse, I don't see how UPST can continue its rapid decline (even though I said this 50% ago as well) since at some point there has to be a valuation-stop such as its 800m unrestricted cash balance. Given its current hatred by many investors, its exposure to macroeconomic conditions, and recently-slashed forward guidance, it will take a bit of work and luck for UPST to dig itself out of the hole its in.
Upside Potential (1-7): [6] (Although investors certainly take on considerable risks with UPST, there are massive rewards to be reaped if the bulls are right and UPST continues its historic growth trajectory after this macroeconomic hiccup. The lending market is absolutely huge. UPST's business has been almost entirely in personal loans and grown tremendously. They are now going into small business and auto loans, and might perhaps tap into the enormous mortgage market one day. If UPST's model turns out to be what it is supposed to, then there is massive opportunity and growth potential. With its extremely low valuation multiple right now of 2x revenue and its capital-light/high-margin profitability profile, the upside could be enormous if it continues to grow after macroeconomic conditions improve. It's cash balance gives it the option of buying back stock at its current cheap valuation, which is almost unheard of for high-growth companies. The buybacks, in combination with multiple expansion and revenue growth can transform the stock into a ten-bagger or more within a few years. A potential acquisition is also not out of the question; perhaps a larger fintech company that offers lending services or banks threatened by UPST's AI could acquire UPST at its currently depressed valuation. Personally, I would prefer it not to get acquired since it would be for probably a maximum of 50% premium to current levels - the reason UPST intrigues me is for its large upside potential, not just a 50% gain to take me to my cost basis or even less. In summary, the risks inherent in UPST are balanced well by its upside potential if armageddon doesn't strike and UPST's path to further growth and profitability continues as it was before the Fed began its tightening in late 2021. Sometimes, the best time to buy a stock is when it is most hated and gets slammed because of macroeconomic conditions, which could very well be the case right now for UPST.)
Why I Like the Stock:
As mentioned already, what drew me to look deeper into UPST was its insane growth while also bring profitable. Nearly all growth companies are unprofitable and cash-flow negative when growing at 100%+ YoY as these companies are investing heavily to grow. UPST was able to leverage its relatively low fixed cost business with strong contribution margins to become profitable at an early stage while still growing extremely fast. This allows UPST to have a strong balance sheet to weather storms (like the one it is experiencing now) and the capability of buying back stock. While other high-growth companies generally increase their share count through stock-based compensation early on because of their inability to pay employees in cash, and thus dilute shareholders early on, UPST not only uses minimal stock-based compensation, but also uses its profitability to decrease the share count through buybacks to reward investors holding long-term. The combination of profitability, positive cash flow, and high growth creates an opportunity for amplified shareholder returns over the long term.
As far as its core business, UPST regularly releases pretty detailed data on its loan performance, default rates, etc. compared to traditional FICO loan performance. UPST has seen consistent outperformance on its loans and also sees it improving over time as its models are refined through more data. Therefore, so far, it has added value to borrowers by giving them quicker and easier access to credit, and to lenders who are able to fund better-performing loans. I am by no means a lending, technology, or fin-tech expert but UPST's growth, financial results, loan-performance data, and continual addition of new bank partners speaks for itself. There has to be some real benefits from its model to be able to grow at such an exceptional pace - it wouldn't just happen by accident.
UPST continues to add new funding partners such as banks and credit unions. This is significant for multiple reasons. First, this validates that UPST's risk model and algorithm is attractive to lending partners, and offers increased returns with lower risk compared to traditional FICO models. As mentioned earlier, it also expands the potential borrower cohort of the lenders as UPST's model is able to qualify individuals who are 'incorrectly' denied under traditional FICO. This brings in more business for lenders. Second, adding new funding parters, especially ones with large amounts of capital who don't withdraw a large portion of funding in economic downturns, solves UPST's problems of i) not being able to originate a loan because a lack of funding, and ii) funding the loans from its own balance sheet and taking on credit risk. Currently, UPST has said that the lenders it currently works with are very conservative due to macroeconomic conditions, so it has had to deny borrowers who qualify. Overall, the continual addition of new lending partners means that UPST's funding mechanisms are improving and that its algorithm is trusted by lenders.
The lending market is obviously ginormous. So far, UPST's growth has been solely due to its personal lending services. They are just starting to tap into the automobile and small business loan segments, which have a large opportunity awaiting (launched in 2022). While it will take some time to penetrate these markets, it provides additional avenues of growth.
Although current economic conditions cause temporary pain for UPST's revenue growth and profitability, it allows its AI model to be refined and tweaked to be better able to assess default risk in future economic downturns, strengthening UPST's algorithm and providing it a further competitive edge.
UPST's revenue growth over the last several years has been absolutely stellar. In 2018, they had $99m in revenue, 2019 - $164m (65% YoY growth), 2020 - $233m (42% YoY growth even with the pandemic), 2021 - $849m (265% YoY growth!). Something seems to be working for their business, and it doesn't seem to have only been boosted by massive economic stimulus in 2020/2021 as they had strong growth before. Additionally, consumers have less of a demand for personal loans when they are being given stimulus payments and being forgiven for rent. It is during economically difficult times that personal loans should theoretically be in higher demand. Despite UPST's problems obtaining funding for their loans from banks and other institutions, they had $310m in revenue in Q1 2022 (156% YoY growth from Q1 2021). In Q2 2022, their revenue declined to 228m, but that was partly due to a $30m markdown on the loans they held on their balance sheet because of rising interest rates (another problem with having to fund loans through their own balance sheet); however, their fee revenue for Q2 2022, which is a better gauge of their operational success, was actually $258m, up 38% YoY. UPST stock got dinged recently because of their weak guidance of $170m in revenue for Q3 2022. This decline in revenue, in my opinion, is largely attributable to funding constraints and markdown in loans, which are seemingly temporary problems and not long-term thesis breakers for UPST (assuming they are able to improve and streamline their funding process, which they said will happen over time).
To go in a bit more depth on UPST's balance sheet and profitability, its 800m in unrestricted cash is about 40% of its market cap currently. Even though the company would never do so, they can theoretically buy back 40% of their stock at its current market cap of $2b and probably remain in business if they are cash flow positive, which they have been for most of their recent history. More realistically, they will just use up more of the remaining $275m in authorized buybacks, which at the current valuation, would equal roughly 14% of the company's outstanding shares - that is still a huge buyback. In addition, most of UPST's costs are fixed; therefore, as they grow, their operating leverage will allow them to increase their net margins and FCF margin. UPST can also fund its own growth without the reliance on borrowing money or issuing equity to raise capital, which is a big problem for unprofitable and cash-flow negative companies in 2022.
The company's balance sheet and profitability setup resembles that of a mature, slow-growing, cash-generating software company - however, UPST is still in its early growth stages and in a truly unique position to provide immense shareholder returns if their business model proves resilient and competitive. That is why I highly stress that UPST is a true risk-reward opportunity. While there are definitely uncertainties, there are promising signs to perhaps overcome those uncertainties - if they are successful in their business model, then shareholder returns (earnings/share, FCF/share, buybacks, dividends etc.) will be unlike that of any recent high-growth company. For comparison, some companies grow at a very fast pace, but do so unprofitably and by using stock-based compensation (diluting shareholders), which diminishes the potential for exponential shareholder returns in the long-term.
Another important quality many well-known investors look for before investing in a company is whether it is owner-operated, meaning a founder/significant shareholder is running the company. The reason for this is because they have skin in the game and are highly motivated to make the company succeed. His/her interests are aligned with that of long-term shareholders. UPST's founder Dave Girouard was the former President of Google Cloud and has served as CEO since Upstart's inception in 2012. It's comforting to have a CEO who has a large stake in the company (~14% stake in UPST for Girouard) and has a fire in his belly, which Girouard seems to possess.
While I can yap on and on about the future which could very well not come to fruition, the bottom line is you are buying a high-growth stock with big upside potential at a very cheap valuation. It doesn't even need to grow nearly at the pace it has in the past to justify a higher valuation multiple. The worst case is you lose 100% of your investment. The best case is probably a ten-fold or more return in the next few years once macroeconomic conditions improve. UPST is worth a look for investors looking to add a relatively small position in a speculative company in their portfolios that can grow to a large position over time.
Coupa Software ($COUP) (as of Sept. 22, 2022, with stock at $62.18)
**SIGNIFICANT UPDATE AS OF DEC. 2022 -- COUPA TO BE ACQUIRED AT $81 BY PRIVATE EQUITY GROUP** - details below
Basic/Key Financial Data:
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Trading at ~5x Revenue
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800m TTM Revenue (90% is ARR (annual recurring revenue))
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35% annual growth over last 6 years (lower this year/next year guidance)
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60% Gross Margins (mediocre)
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$175m in TTM Operating Cash Flows
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100m buyback authorization (not significant - will only offset most of stock-based compensation)
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Not profitable on a GAAP basis
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Stock-based compensation is ~30% of revenues (not great)
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$3 trillion in spend under management
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [3] Coupa's primary risk currently is from the market's dislike for unprofitable tech companies because of higher interest rates. This risk is mitigated by their positive cash flows and the recurring nature of their revenues, which provides stability to the company in uncertain times. Historically, Coupa has grown their revenues approximately 35-40% annually, which is lower than many other software companies, but it has been doing so steadily and consistently. However, their growth has also slowed down in the past year - if I had to guess, it's probably because of the reluctance of businesses to spend money on new enterprise software in the short-term because of macroeconomic concerns. Coupa's gross margins are not as high as other SAAS companies and they use a significant amount of stock-based compensation which investors are wary about. All these factors have come to investors' attention with the intense scrutiny of unprofitable SAAS companies in a rising rate environment, making sentiment around Coupa at its worst since its 2016 IPO. However, given its already massive decline, all-time low valuation multiple, and its high % of recurring revenues, I can't see how the risk-reward favors selling at these levels.
Upside Potential (1-7): [5] Coupa is the market leader in BSM and specializes in the segment, offering a variety of fine-tuned products to help businesses lower costs and operate more efficiently. Thus, as the BSM market expands, Coupa is likely to capture a significant portion of the potentially deca-billion dollar industry in the coming years. They are trading at approximately 5x TTM revenues, which is well below their average since IPO just like many other technology stocks now. Coupa's revenues are almost 90% recurring, meaning once they eventually slow down their growth phase and focus on profitability, they can maintain a significant portion of their revenues and take advantage of the operating leverage inherent in recurring revenue SAAS companies. BSM could be the next booming enterprise software segment - Coupa has indicated it has significant expansion opportunities among its current customers by cross-selling products and also thousands of new companies who have yet to move to the cloud for their spend management needs. Overall, I would characterize Coupa as the market leader in a total addressable market that could be huge in the coming decade, perhaps making Coupa a multi-bagger in the years to come. If Coupa's stock remains at these depressed valuations, I would not be shocked if ORCL, SAP, or CRM attempt to acquire Coupa to complement their SAAS offerings.
As for its business, COUP caught my attention among many other software companies because of its relatively unique product offerings. BSM is not a highly penetrated market and has a few key players such as ORCL and SAP. However, COUP is the market leader specializing in just BSM, unlike its competitors. It is fine-tuning its product offerings to offer a comprehensive BSM platform for its customers. The reason why I thought the segment and COUP had tailwinds in the coming years were because of the supply-chain concerns COVID created and the inflationary pressures being felt by many industries. These problems will probably only accelerate the adoption of more advanced spend management tools. COUP is a solution for these companies to manage their supply-chain efficiently and decrease costs. So as management teams search for ways to fix supply-chain problems and lower costs, COUP's spend management platform offers the comprehensive set of tools to do so in a modern way (through cloud-based software). It's more worth it visit their website and skim through their product offerings instead of me trying to list their uses through jargon I don't even fully understand.
COUP's platform is a community and database of suppliers and businesses looking to fulfill their sourcing and procurement needs. Businesses can sort through many suppliers, compare prices, and read reviews in trying to find the best supplier. COUP's platform also collects data on the thousands of users on their platform to make AI-based recommendations to its customers to better control their spend. The more businesses use COUP and the more $$$ they have under spend management, the more data they can gather to offer its customers better insights into how to improve their spend. Based on the CEO's talks, it seems like COUP is taking a more methodical and step-by-step approach to growth, focusing on ensuring each customer's needs are met and that the product they offer is of the best quality. While this might mean less growth in the short-term, it is likely to improve their customer retention by making the product fine-tuned - in the software world, they call this a sticky or mission-critical product. Once businesses start saving money by spending efficiently through the COUP platform, they will be reluctant to reverse course and remove a comprehensive software that only becomes more useful over time as the network grows.
COUP's business model is one that makes sense in both good and bad economic times. In good times, businesses obviously have money to spend to improve their infrastructure and efficiency - this includes upgrading on-premises software to the cloud. However, in bad economic times, COUP's platform could become even more essential than in good times. While demand and pricing power decreases, businesses need to save money and cut costs. By improving a business's spending, COUP will help the business get through tough economic times and building a lower-cost/more efficient foundation to boost profitability when times improve.
We are in an era of a shift from on-premises traditional software as a service products to cloud-based software, where companies like COUP can gather tremendous amount of data/insights and build a network that delivers value to its customers. While the first wave of the cloud revolution has taken place, a significant amount of enterprise software has yet to shift to the cloud. While there was definitely pull-forward demand during COVID, the longer-term trend remains intact and cloud companies will likely continue to grow their market share of enterprise software. Not only will COUP benefit from the general industry trend, COUP is in a niche area of the market which, according to COUP, has a $90 billion + total addressable market. While there are of course uncertainties as to why BSM is not currently its own huge segment, but rather an ancillary offering to many bundled SAAS products, the value it offers companies is pretty common sense. Additionally, COUP's advantage in the BSM market is also meaningful given that they specialize in it and also have a ton of users/data already in their system, creating a network effect which is hard to replicate or compete with.
COUP's valuation has also been so compressed and way below its average since IPO, that any sign of COUP's return to 30%+ annual growth will probably cause a meaningful expansion of the revenue multiple (while 5x revenue is not necessarily cheap, recurring revenue businesses generally earn higher multiples). Software companies are the most hated they have ever been, even though COVID really accelerated the shift to the cloud. Valuations across the board have been compressed to all-time low multiples. Paying 5x revenue for a recurring revenue software company that has grown 35%+ annually is definitely not unreasonable - although COUP's growth has slowed in the past few quarters, I don't see a reason for their long-term thesis to be damaged. Even if growth going forward is 20% annually, its current valuation is very compelling. While unprofitable, COUP is planting the seeds for the future by investing heavily in its product and establishing itself as the market leader. (If they really wanted to and their horizon was 2-3 years, I'm sure they can fire half of their staff and operate at 15-20% margins to please Wall Street's insatiable appetite for profitability. This would put them at a current PE of 25x - again, this is all hypothetical.) While unprofitable, COUP maintains positive operating cash flow thanks to their use of SBC, but still maintains strong per share revenue growth of 30% in the last 4 years. If growth companies gain any sort of favor with the Wall Street crowd again, COUP's multiple could very well improve, or at least stabilize given it is in freefall right now. As a side note, COUP's buyback is insignificant except it flaunts its free-cash flow and offsets some of the SBC - not a bad thing though.
Finally, COUP is definitely an acquisition target being considered by several large software companies. These depressed valuations give cash-rich and well-performing software giants the opportunity to scoop up bargains to integrate into their offerings. I wouldn't be surprised if ORCL, SAP, or CRM tried to acquire COUP. SAP and ORCL are considered leaders in the BSM space after COUP - if they want to expand and improve their offerings, they could integrate COUP's advanced and niche BSM software into their probably more generic procurement/sourcing offerings.
Full disclosure, I am by no means a software expert or involved in any technology related business. The information above is from research I've done sitting behind a computer, so take my word for what it is - an investor looking for value. I could be very wrong about SAAS trends and COUP's value to businesses, so my opinion should only complement any further research you do before investing. I also have the bad habit in looking for really beaten up companies that I don't think should be that beaten up - this generally isn't the best way of investing, especially in the short-term when the trend remains down for the stock. COUP is an absolutely despised stock right now and will need to perform strongly to gain investor confidence and have institutional money interested. My persistence, FOMO, and ego have kept me intrigued in COUP even as it has been obliterated. Bottom line, COUP is a medium-growth niche software company that is trading at historically low-multiples that has a potentially huge market to take share of. Its safety nets are 1) either an acquisition, or 2) the recurring nature of its revenues (allowing it to take advantage of the operating leverage inherent in such a business model when the company focuses on profitability later on).
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**SIGNIFICANT UPDATE:**
$COUP will be acquired by private equity group Thoma Bravo, a private equity group specializing in software. $COUP will be acquired for $81 a share ($8b enterprise value and at 10x EV to revenue multiple). COUP's cash flow generation, steady but consistent growth, recurring revenues, and future market size made it a prime candidate for an acquisition. There were several bidders for the company. While this acquisition confirms my long-term conviction in the stock and my investing approach in general, it is definitely bitter-sweet. I wanted to hold COUP long-term (10+ years) hoping for a 10x+ of my investment. Unfortunately, I will no longer be able to remain an investor as my shares will be sold off as of the closing date, which is expected in early 2023 (unless shareholders vote down the acquisition). While I will raise buying power to add to other positions, the time I spent researching and accumulating shares will not reap me the rewards I hoped for. However, this is out of my control and it is part of the risks of investing. For investors who only bought in the last couple of months, returns in that short period of time are huge, with COUP being acquired for 100% above its November 2022 low.
While I did expect an acquisition (as mentioned above in September), I thought a strategic buyer would have been more likely rather than a private equity group. Thoma Bravo will probably work on improving profitability at the company and exit in ~5 years by bringing it public or selling to a strategic buyer for a premium of what they bought COUP for. They will sit through the market volatility and uncertainty until investor sentiment improves before seeking an exit. If I had the choice, I would keep my shares instead of selling it at $81.
Wells Fargo ($WFC) (as of Sept. 21, 2022, with stock at $42.27)
Why I Like the Stock:
There's not too much to dive into for WFC unless it gets really technical and using bank jargon, most of which I don't even understand. But, as already mentioned, buying big banks in general is a way to bet on macroeconomic conditions. Rising interest rates generally benefit banks while it hurts many other types of companies because of higher costs of capital. It's one way to diversify a portfolio.
WFC has a lot of exposure to interest rates because of net interest income (net interest income is the difference between what the bank pays and deposits and what it earns on its investments). Net interest income (and margins) increase during periods of higher interest rates. These go straight to the bottom line of banks, allowing them to profit off higher rates. For context, in WFC's most recent earnings report (Q3 2022), its net interest income was up 18% just from the prior quarter and 36% YoY. Net interest income makes up over half of the company's total revenues, so the impact of higher interest rates on the company's profitability is meaningful. If rates stay elevated, banks like WFC will continue to benefit through increased earnings. This increase in profitability, obviously, assumes credit remains as strong as it has been and delinquencies/defaults remain low as they are now. These will be dependent on macroeconomic conditions.
Banks are now highly regulated, must pass regular stress tests, must maintain certain reserve balances, and more. The risk of these banks 'failing' or suffering a 2008-like scare are slim-to-none. The big banks all have strong balance sheet and risk management procedures in place. Therefore, the risk of systemic failures or over-leveraging by WFC and other banks is not a reason to avoid the sector. Rather, deteriorating credit quality/significant recession is the real concern, but not an end-of-the-world one.
WFC and other big banks deliver value to shareholders both through significant buybacks and dividends. WFC has restored a significant % of its dividend since the 2020 cuts and has been buying back stock at a rapid pace. They are pausing now due to macroeconomic concerns but will likely resume in 2023 if economic conditions allow.
As far as WFC specific, management has been clear that it is cutting costs and improving its efficiency ratio, which is a common measure used by banks/bank analysts at analyzing a bank's profitability profile. They have been making good progress on this front and slowly improving their efficiency. Additionally, WFC has an asset cap imposed by the Federal Reserve as punishment for its 2016 scandal. WFC has a target on its back and is trying hard to comply with regulators so that its asset cap can be removed. Once this occurs, it will be a significant catalyst for growth and earnings. We don't know when this will happen, so investors looking to buy WFC should not do so solely for this purpose, but can have this bonus catalyst as a future reward.
As far as its valuation, it is trading at a slight discount compared to BAC/JPM (based on tangible book value) because of the turnaround nature of the company (cutting costs/asset cap). Its PE is fair on a historical basis - once again, these traditional measures are less useful for such an economically sensitive industry like banking. The 'value' WFC adds to a portfolio is diversification, return of capital through buybacks/dividends, and company-specific catalysts like the asset cap removal. Young investors with smaller portfolios are likely to steer away from a boring stock like WFC, but if your goal is to have a more stable and income-oriented portfolio, WFC is a great way to get exposure to financials. For more actively managed accounts, WFC is a good way to generate passive income through covered calls.
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Basic/Key Financial Data:
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~10 PE
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2.75% dividend yield
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Trading at 1.3x tangible book value (tangible book value is the amount shareholders would receive if the bank liquidated its assets and paid off its liabilities)
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Financial metrics for big banks are tougher to analyze out of context and aren't as useful without diving deeper into them, so for simplicity purposes, I will defer to more of the qualitative aspects below (knowing that the #s back up those points)
Risk Level of Stock (1-7): [2] WFC is a stock very dependent on cyclical conditions (ex: interest rates, unemployment, credit quality, and overall health of economy). It's risk level is heavily tied to that of the economy. However, absent a 2008-like crisis or a deep recession, the downside remains limited as WFC and other big banks have strong balance sheets, risk management systems in place, and reserves prepared to handle economic downturns. WFC also trades at about 1.3 times its tangible book value, which is fair. Since the beginning of 2021, banks have showed strong earnings as the economy reopened, and continue to show strong results from higher interest rates. The risk level for WFC and other banks is highly dependent on unpredictable economic conditions, but big US banks (JPM, BAC, WFC) are better-suited than ever to handle economic downturns and to over time, return meaningful capital to shareholders through modest dividends and buybacks. In essence, unlike risky growth stocks whose business prospects are uncertain, WFC isn't going to fall 50% without some broad macroeconomic calamity. Those looking for a low-beta (not very volatile) stock in the financial sector as a core holding can find it in WFC.
Upside Potential (1-7): [3] The upside for big banks in general is not going to be huge (unless you buy during huge crashes driven by macroeconomic disasters such as 2008 and 2020 COVID). From current levels, the return profile for big banks is modest and will be driven by the economy/interest rates. All big banks have the means to buy back shares unless there is a significant recession, during which they will be forced to preserve capital. WFC has a few unique catalysts other big banks don't. First, and most importantly, WFC's business is meaningfully limited by the asset cap the Fed put in place to punish WFC for its 2016 scandals. This forces WFC to keep its total assets under $2 trillion, impeding its ability to generate further growth/earnings. WFC is and has been working to comply with regulators with the hopes of removing the asset cap, which would be a significant catalyst for the company. When that happens, the stock will almost certainly soar. Second, WFC is working to improve its efficiency by cutting costs. They have improved over the last few quarters and are focused on improving their profitability profile. Third, WFC benefits more from higher rates (due to higher net interest margins) than other banks given its comparatively large lending/banking business. Finally, WFC trades at a price-to-book value lower than its peers JPM/BAC, who are seen as "higher quality" banks. I imagine this gap in valuation will shrink over time as WFC's regulatory and operational 'problems' are resolved. WFC is somewhat of a turnaround story within a boring and very cyclical industry of big banks, making its upside potential not solely tied to macroeconomic conditions like the other big banks.
*Bonus Companies* (brief notes) (as of November 2022)
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Penn is a casino operator in the United States with both physical casinos and online gambling
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They own Barstool Sports
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Unlike WYNN, LVS, etc., they have no exposure to China/Macau (no international locations)
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Consistently profitable/not losing money like other sports gambling companies (ex: Draftkings)
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Trading at roughly 20 PE and 750m buyback program authorized - valuation is reasonable
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Good way to bet (no pun intended) on the gambling industry in the US, but obviously vulnerable to economic downturns and not high-growth; its growth prospects are also in a very competitive industry (sports gambling), hurting pricing power and requiring more advertising spend over time
Risk: 4​​
Reward: 4
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Netflix is obviously a subscription-based streaming platform
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Will very soon be monetizing through advertisements as well
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In a very competitive industry, competing with Disney +, Amazon Prime, etc.
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Among the worst-performing 'mega-cap' companies in the past year (down 65% from highs); I wouldn't even classify it as a mega-cap anymore or a part of FAANG
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Trading at all-time low PE multiple (20x), although their growth is still steady - so valuation looks attractive on historical basis
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In the short to medium term, I see the market favoring NFLX again once growth stocks make a comeback, but the future of the company is highly uncertain in my opinion
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My long-term view on the stock is less optimistic - there is a possibility that competition and the constant need to spend on producing content will eat into their margins and end up with an unsustainable business model. One of their primary competitors, Disney + , has a ginormous catalog full of brands, franchises, and content that it can recycle and expand upon. This allows Disney to spend far less on advertising/promoting new shows and also producing fresh content. The counter-argument/bullish-thesis is that their scale allows them to remain profitable on relatively fixed production costs, and that they will not get into price wars with their competition, but instead co-exist.
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Beaten down tech stock trading at historically cheap valuation with fears that the investment thesis is in danger
Risk: 5​
Reward: 4
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Fiverr is a small-cap technology company putting up 50% YoY growth
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They essentially are a platform for freelancers to look for work from businesses or individuals; it's a gig economy like Uber/Lyft
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The services provided by the freelancers include design, graphics, marketing, software development, video editing, and more.
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Main competitor is Upwork, which does the same thing essentially. Upwork is a bit larger but growing slower (25% YoY)
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Perhaps layoffs in the tech space might increase the # of freelancers on the platform as they seek work for side income; but on the flip-side, macro slowdown could cause a dent in demand from the end-customers
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Stock-based compensation not excessive
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80% gross margins and ~3% FCF yield, but still significantly unprofitable on GAAP-basis
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Small-cap speculative stock with good top-line growth, 3x revenue multiple, and positive FCF; high- risk/high-reward
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Paypal is the largest pure fintech company that, as many know, operates an online payment platform
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Fintech is a very competitive industry constantly threatened by new entrants and products
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Owns Venmo (only small % of PYPL's revenue but growing) and is working to launch more services on its "super app" which already includes online payments, shopping, savings, and a wallet to manage your digital finances - goal is to be a one-stop-shop for online finance/payments
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Historically grown revenue at ~20% annually, which is impressive given their scale ($25b revenue in 2021)
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Profitable and generating significant free-cash-flow (currently trading at historically-low PE of 20) and has significant buyback authorization of $15b
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Lots of recent pessimism from Wall Street because of PYPL's alleged desperate attempt to buy Pinterest because of PYPL's slowing growth, overhang from the termination of PYPL's partnership with eBay, macroeconomic concerns, and increased competition from other fintech players
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Despite the recent pessimism, PYPL remains a market leader that is consistently profitable and can endure economic downturns - however, competition in the space could stunt growth or compress margins
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While the valuation is enticing, the business faces competitive pressures - with other big tech names possessing more resilient businesses (like GOOG, MSFT, META) trading near or below PYPL's PE multiple, its hard to allocate capital to PYPL now. However, their brand name, position as market leader, suite of products, buyback power, and catalysts such as Venmo growth, the end of ex-eBay revenue hits, and eventual improvement of macro conditions warrants a look at a severely beaten down tech stock at all-time low multiples. Additionally, some of their competition might fail to survive this intense deterioration in financial conditions, clearing the way for PYPL or offering cheap acquisition targets
Risk: 5​
Reward: 5
Risk: 4​
Reward: 3
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We all know Amex as the premier credit card company
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It's higher-income cardholder base less likely to reduce spending in economic downturns
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Trades at a very reasonable 14 PE and is a free cash flow machine
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Buys back stock consistently because of its consistent profitability/cash flow and even has a 1.5% dividend
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More resilient to inflationary pressures given that it collects a % fee from transactions
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In addition to transaction fee revenue and membership fees, unlike Visa/Mastercard, Amex also collects interest income (Visa/Mastercard partner with banks and instead only collect fees)
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A solid blue-chip financial to have as a core holding
Risk: 2​
Reward: 3
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Airplane manufacturing is a duopoly, dominated by Boeing and Airbus
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Near impossible barrier to entry, so Boeing's competitive threats are slim
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Since COVID hit, investors have been disappointed with management's handling of operations
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Prior to COVID, Boeing was a cash flow machine, growing, and expanding its margins
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Since COVID, they've had trouble getting back to profitability and positive FCF (investors blame management, but supply chain problems/disruption in airline industry/labor shortages are partly to blame as well probably)
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Regulatory concerns with certain models in both US, Europe, and China that need to be cleared up
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Huge backlog of over 4,000 planes (orders it still has to fulfill)
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As far as airplane demand, airline companies are currently doing great and have been ordering new planes - demand likely won't wane as post-COVID travel continues to remain strong; also, with fuel prices high, airlines will look to purchase newer and more fuel-efficient planes
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30%+ of its business comes from defense contracts, a steadier and more reliable revenue stream
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A once blue-chip cash flow machine is now a turnaround story with management's credibility on the line; it's a good thing they are part of a duopoly
Risk: 4​
Reward: 4
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Software-as-a-service company that helps businesses communicate with and engage with customers
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Offers a wide variety of services over the cloud such as helping businesses in customer service, marketing, operations, and more through automated texts, emails, voice chat, etc.
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Trades at roughly 2x TTM revenue, at an all time low valuation
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Gross margins of roughly 50%, which is quite low for a SAAS company (typical GM is 70%+)
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Average revenue growth of 60% YoY over the past 4 years (only 40% on a revenue per share basis, taking into account dilution from stock-based compensation)
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Dollar-based net expansion rate of ~120%, which is a good number and means its customers are spending more each year on TWLO's services
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Significantly unprofitable on a GAAP net income basis (-35%+ margins)
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Over $3b in net cash/marketable securities after subtracting long-term debt; trading at less than 2x book value after removing goodwill/intangible assets (for context, TWLO is trading at an 8b market cap)
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Cash-flow negative, but plans to achieve positive free-cash-flow in 2023 (their cash-burn is not that bad)
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This is a typical software company that is highly unprofitable, uses excess stock-based compensation, and has relied only on top-line growth the past few years - their shift to profitability and how quickly they do so will dictate the future of the company and the stock. The valuation has been demolished and will likely not show signs of reversal until investors gain confidence for its future profitability
Risk: 5​
Reward: 5
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Cybersecurity SAAS company that protects the identity/accounts of a business' employees and customers (I'm not a tech geek so I couldn't tell you too much about the business itself - my inquiry is primarily in the financials of the company)
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~1.5b TTM revenues and trading at roughly 5x sales
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Has historically grown revenues at ~60% annually, about to put up ~40% growth this year (however, growth is closer to 30% on a per share basis when taking into account dilution)
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Gross margins of 70% and near break-even on a cash-flow basis
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Hefty cash/short-term marketable securities balance of $2.5b
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Dollar-based net retention rate of ~120%, which is a good number and means its customers are spending more each year on OKTA's services
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Almost 95% of its revenues are recurring/subscription-based
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Significantly unprofitable on a GAAP net income basis (-50%+ margins); majority of losses are due to SBC expense - OKTA has the capability based on its balance sheet/cash flow to minimize the dilutive effects of SBC at these depressed stock prices by using its cash to buy back stock
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Similar to other SAAS companies whose business has the capability of cutting costs significantly (laying people off) without sacrificing much revenue given the leverage inherent in a subscription-based software business, it can shift towards profitability relatively easily if needed
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This is a typical software company that is highly unprofitable, uses excess stock-based compensation, and has relied only on top-line growth the past few years - their shift to profitability and how quickly they do so will dictate the future of the company and the stock. (similar to TWLO)
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Okta's fit in a portfolio is for those seeking somewhat established speculative plays whose valuations are at all-time lows and whose upside is significant if the bear case doesn't play out
Risk: 3​
Reward: 5